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1. Introduction 
In my 1986 paper on private sector shrinkage, I tested the hypothesis that, 
ceterisparibus, economies with large and growing government sectors exert in- 
verse influences on real economic growth. The data used in my paper were pub- 
lished in OECD (1985) and contained various measures of government spend- 
ing and economic growth of 19 major industrialized economies over the 
interval 1960-1981. My analysis of the data concluded that there exists suffi- 
cient empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that economies with rela- 
tively larger public sectors are associated with relatively poorer economic 
growth and that the results 'clearly call into question the wisdom of allowing 
public sectors to grow at the expense of private sectors' (Marlow, 1986: 152). 
I quoted OECD's (1985: 14) observation that, 'Rather than being widely 
regarded as a major contributor to economic growth and macroeconomic sta- 
bility, the view that the growth and financing of the public sector has, on 
balance, stifled growth now attracts widespread support.' Despite this 'wide- 
spread' view, I noted that, 'At the macroeconomic level, preliminary cross- 
country comparisons undertaken by the Secretariat have failed to reveal an in- 
verse relationship between public sector size and economic performance as 
reflected in GDP growth rates ...,' OECD (1985: 15). 
Saunders (1987) argues that, based on OECD's analysis and subsequent 
elaboration of the empirical results in Saunders (1985) and Saunders (1986), 
OECD's own analysis of these data are correct and that 'my conclusions ap- 
pear to be unwarrantedly strong.' Saunders (1988) alleges that my analysis of 
the data contains numerous flaws; namely, my use of the unconventional real 
government expenditure series, 'extreme' sensitivity of my results to the time 
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interval, my error in including Japan in the sample and the exclusion of 'ap- 
propriate' control factors in my regression equations. 
In this paper, I submit the data to further scrutinity and conclude that the 
result that economic growth and government size are inversely related con- 
tinues to be an obvious implication of the data. 
2. Relative price effect 
The first issue concerns the measurement of the scale of a government's par- 
ticipation in the economy. Saunders states that my use of the price-deflated ser- 
ies on government expenditures 'stands in contrast to all other work in this 
area, which adopts the more conventional ratios of nominal expenditures to 
nominal GDP.' The basic issue concerns the 'relative price effect' which refers 
to the possibility that the growth of the share of nominal government spending 
may differ from the growth of the share of real government spending. That is, 
the real index, GE(R) = constant dollar government spending/constant dol- 
lar GDP, will differ from the nominal index, GE(N) = nominal government 
spending/ nominal GDP, when the price indices of government spending and 
GDP differ. 
Saunders' comment is curious since, as discussed in Saunders (1986), there 
is a debate on this issue; e.g., see Beck (1976), Beck (1979), Beck (1985) and 
Heller (1981). In any event, it would appear that given the lack of a consensus 
on the issue, it might be appropriate to ask what difference the relative price 
effect makes on the estimation of the government size - economic growth re- 
lation. Tables 1- 3 display estimations of the basic equations of my 1986 paper: 
RGDP = ao + alGE + e (1) 
RGDP = 0 + 3IGE + 32RGE + 4 (2) 
where RGDP = compound annual rate of growth of real GDP 
GE(R) = ratio of real government expenditure to GDP in initial peri- 
od of RGDP measurement; 
GE(N) = ratio of nominal government expenditure to nominal GDP 
in initial period of RGDP measurement; 
RGE(R) = compound annual growth rate of GE(R); 
RGE(N) = compound annual growth rate of GE(N); 
E, 9 = random disturbance terms. 
I have deleted one set of equations from my 1986 period - those which run 
RGDP on only a constant and RGE. These were routinely poor fits and do not 
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alter the present discussion. I have also deleted the equations dealing with so- 
cial expenditures for brevity and to focus on the main source of Saunders' criti- 
cism. In contrast to Saunders (1987), I have displayed the regression results for 
(1) as well as (2). As can be seen, either measure of GE is highly statistically 
significant for the period 1960-1970 and 1960-1980. As in my 1986 paper, 
the government scale variable is generally not statistically different from zero 
over 1970-1980. Moreover, as shown in Saunders' comment, the use of a 
nominal-based government scale variable GE(N) results in higher levels of 
statistical significance and relatively large increases in the equations' explana- 
tory power. Given that my 1986 paper did not find much support for the hypo- 
thesis that the rate of change of government expenditure xerts a significant in- 
fluence on economic growth, the 'relative price effect' issue would appear to 
offer no additional information on the validity of that hypothesis. Conse- 
quently, based on the fact that there exists no consensus on how to measure 
government scale and the fact that Saunders' preferred measure actually 
provides stronger support for my hypothesis, I view this particular criticism as 
curious. 
3. Excluding Japan from the sample 
The next criticism deals with the assertion that Japan should not be included 
in the sample of observations - an assertion that I interpret as implying that 
Japan has no relevant information for us as economists. For some reason, 
Saunders believes this particular member of the OECD should be treated as 
different from the other member countries.1 Interestingly, Saunders offers no 
a priori reasoning to justify this deletion from the sample. Rather, it would ap- 
pear that justification arrived ex post after Saunders observed that Japan is a 
major contributor to the inverse relation between economic growth and 
government size. Without a doubt, Japan has a relatively high economic 
growth rate over these periods and a correspondingly low level of government 
participation in the economy. I wonder if economists could infer any valuable 
lessons from this country? Proponents of its deletion may suggest not. Their 
argument may be based on the fear that its inclusion might 'contaminate' the 
testing of the economic growth-government size hypothesis. 
Somewhat curious about the criticism, I re-estimated my equations without 
Japan. Using both real- and nominal-based measures of government scale, I 
re-estimated my equations and they are displayed in the lower parts of Tables 
1-3. Saunders is correct on one count: the significance levels and goodness of 
fit do fall when Japan is excluded. However, this is the expected result of a 
scheme that seeks to limit the amount of variation in the variables being ex- 
amined. 
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Table 1. Government growth and economic growth, 1960-1970 (regression results) - dependent 
variable: Real GDP growth 1960-1970 
Equation Constant GE(R) GE(N) RGE(R) RGE(N) iR2 N 
(1) 12.91 -23.97 .32 16 
(4.76) (2.87) 
(2) 14.21 -31.69 .56 16 
(6.95) (4.46) 
(3) 13.11 - 23.91 -0.40 .39 16 
(5.06) (3.00) (1.54) 
(4) 14.26 -31.70 -0.03 .52 16 
(6.53) (4.30) (.09) 
Excluding Japan 
(5) 8.06 - 9.82 .06 15 
(3.33) (1.34) 
(6) 9.76 - 16.85 .18 15 
(3.96) (2.01) 
(7) 8.34 -10.52 -0.07 -.02 15 
(3.14) (1.33) (0.32) 
(8) 9.55 - 16.57 0.07 .11 15 
(3.59) (1.89) (.28) 
One fact holds clear: exclusion of Japan does not invalidate the hypothesis. 
Whether one wishes to use a one-tailed or two-tailed test of significance, one 
or both of the measures of government size continues to be statistically differ- 
ent from zero. Why the difference in conclusions reached here and by Saun- 
ders? Several explantions may be correct. One explanation may be that Saun- 
ders appears to prefer to test the hypothesis using a two-tailed test. This may 
be an arguable point and should depend on how one formulates the alternative 
hypothesis, which, in turn, generally is related to some a priori considerations 
or previous empirical evidence. If one views the hypothesis in (1) as Ho: ca = 
0 vs. Ha: at1 d 0, then a two-tailed test is appropriate. A one-tailed test would 
be appropriate for the hypothesis Ho: a = 0 vs. Ha: at < 0. 
I originally chose a one-tailed test, which, in part, may explain some of his 
questioning about my statement of levels of significance. The rationale behind 
this choice was my expectation that the coefficients on ai are negative and 
that, at best, one could expect government size to exert a neutral influence on 
economic growth. On page 145, I discussed the possibility that governments 
could exert a 'facilitating' role on the economy, but that the public sector 
growth over this period was considerably above any threshold level that might 
be wedged in between government growth-as-facilitator of economic growth 
and government growth-as-impediment to growth. The observation that, 
based on Table 1 of my 1986 paper, the average level of the government's share 
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of GDP (GE(R)) had risen from .32 to .40 over 1960-1980 appeared to be 
ample evidence in support of the construction of my hypotheses. Based on 
Saunders' preferred measure GE(N), government's average share of the econ- 
omy grew from .28 to .42 over the same period. Moreover, the construction 
of a one-tailed test would appear to be consistent with OECD's statement, 
'... Rather than being widely regarded as a major contributor to economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability, the view that the growth and financing 
of the public sector has, on balance, stifled growth now attracts widespread 
support' (p. 14). Moreover, prior empirical evidence exists in Landau (1983), 
Orzechowski (1984), and Weede (1984) that, to varying degrees, public sector 
size is inversely related to economic growth. While less than conclusive, these 
studies are available to Saunders and were listed in my 1986 paper. Moreover, 
Saunders (1986) cites Bacon and Eltis (1978), Smith (1975), Cameron (1978), 
Marsden (1983) and Gould (1983) as, at least, suggestive of an inverse relation 
between government size and economic growth. Therefore, contrary to his as- 
sertion, my results are not inconsistent 'with most of the other empirical work 
on the relationship between the size and growth of government in industrial- 
ized economies.' It would appear appropriate for Saunders to provide the im- 
plied long and impressive litany of empirical studies showing the opposite of 
my work before one can accept his assertion that my 1986 paper is inconsistent 
with the majority of empirical work on this issue.2 In addition, Saunders 
might consider providing studies that estimate a positive relation between 
government size and growth before one might conclude that a two-tailed test 
is the appropriate hypothetical construct. 
After having said all this, it turns out that the choice of a one-tailed test vs. 
two-tailed test is not critical to the acceptance of my hypothesis, with or 
without the inclusion of Japan. Using Saunders preferred measure of govern- 
ment size GE(N) and two-tailed tests, the coefficients on GE(N) are statistical- 
ly different from zero during the intervals 1960-1970 and 1960-1980 at the 
respective levels of .10 and .05, or better. Curiously, Saunders lists only real- 
derived government scale variables, GE(R), in his comment on my paper. In 
conclusion, my results are not extremely sensitive to the inclusion of Japan. 
4. Choice of time period 
The criticism that my results are extremely sensitive to the time period chosen 
stems from empirical results presented in Saunders (1985: 11). He interprets 
his 1985 paper as suggesting that economic growth and government growth are 
inversely related over 1960-1973 and not 1975-1981. Three points are in or- 
der. One, as discussed in the section below, his empirical model includes a mis- 
specification which casts considerable doubt on the inferences drawn from his 
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Table 2. Government growth and economic growth, 1970-1980 (regression results) - dependent 
variable: Real GDP growth 1970-1980 
Equation Constant GE(R) GE(N) RGE(R) RGE(N) R2 N 
(1) 5.05 -4.89 .04 16 
(3.82) (1.29) 
(2) 5.05 -4.89 .04 16 
(3.82) (1.29) 
(3) 5.27 -4.06 -0.34 .05 16 
(3.94) (1.04) (1.03) 
(4) 5.40 -5.39 - 0.09 .00 16 
(3.62) (1.35) (.56) 
Excluding Japan 
(5) 3.90 -1.76 -.06 15 
(2.29) (.37) 
(6) 3.90 -1.76 -.06 15 
(2.29) (.37) 
(7) 3.84 0.30 -0.46 .00 15 
(2.33) (.06) (1.37) 
(8) 4.15 -1.57 -0.17 -.06 15 
(2.41) (.33) (1.02) 
Table 3. Government growth and economic growth, 1960-1980 (regression results) - dependent 
variable: Real GDP growth 1960-1980 
Equation Constant GE(R) GE(N) RGE(R) RGE(N) R2 N 
(1) 9.95 - 17.61 .37 16 
(5.47) (3.14) 
(2) 10.56 - 22.07 .56 16 
(7.47) (4.49) 
(3) 10.07 - 17.16 -0.27 .36 16 
(5.46) (3.02) (.83) 
(4) 10.94 - 22.74 -0.09 .53 16 
(6.46) (4.30) (.44) 
Excluding Japan 
(5) 7.23 -9.69 .12 15 
(3.92) (1.73) 
(6) 8.33 - 14.64 .23 15 
(4.39) (2.27) 
(7) 7.30 - 9.78 - 0.04 .05 15 
(3.68) (1.67) (.14) 
(8) 8.75 -15.27 -0.13 .19 15 
(4.23) (2.28) (.60) 
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statistical tests. Two, the coefficient on government size is negative and sig- 
nificant, over 1975-1981, on the basis of a two-tailed test at the .10 level and, 
on the basis of a one-tailed test, at the .05 level. Three, my regression results 
for the interval 1960-1980, in Table 3, show statistical significance for the 
entire period. Even if Saunders' suggestion that the period of the 1970s is sen- 
sitive to the 1973 oil shock and simultaneous decline in ecqnomic growth is 
true, these complications should only be of a transitory nature. As displayed 
in my estimations of the period 1960-1980, these short-run disruptions, if 
present, do not appear to be fundamental to the long-run implications of 
government size on economic growth. Consequently, it is difficult for me to 
take this comment seriously. 
5. Misspecification of my equation 
Saunders argues that '... none of the results are grounded in any model of the 
growth process, however naive this may be. By excluding other factors which 
influence economic growth, their impact may be wrongly interpreted to those 
explanatory variables which are included in the analysis.' In other words, 
Saunders asserts that my conclusions result, in part, from omitted variable 
bias. To correct my 'naive' formulation of the growth process, Saunders in- 
cludes two new variables: the share of non-residential gross fixed capital for- 
mation in GDP averaged over the relevant time period and the share of civilian 
employment in agriculture in the initial year of each period. The extent of the 
economic reasoning behind their inclusion is only to 'capture the impact of 
investment expenditure on economic growth and the possibilities for increased 
growth potential in economies with larger agricultural sectors.' 
It only takes a little simple macroeconomic theory to show the expected ef- 
fect of including an investment variable in the equation. Standard treatment 
of the relation between capital K and government size G is 
K = f(G) + i (3) 
which postulates that government crowds out capital-formation. See Aschauer 
(1987) for a recent paper, with supporting empirical evidence, on the effects 
of public expenditure on private capital accumulation. With Y = output and 
a production relation of the form 
Y = f(K)+ E (4) 
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it follows that estimation of 
Y = f(K, G) + 7 (5) 
may find the coefficient on G to be zero since Y is inversely related to G. 
In other words, if (3) and (4) are true, then estimating (5) is incorrect since 
the coefficient on G is calculated after the correlation between K and G is 
taken account of, and, if G exerts all influence on Y via K, then after regres- 
sion of Y on K and G, there is no remaining influence left for G to exert on 
Y. In this case, then 
Y = f(G) + 6 (6) 
is the true reduced form of (3) and (4), not (5). Saunders' result that G = 0 
after estimating (5) is consistent with my work when (3) and (4) are true. 
The above demonstrates that economic theory does not provide the basis for 
Saunders' findings that government size does not influence economic growth 
once one controls for the effects of capital formation on Y. While some may 
be tempted to 'throw' as many variables into an equation as one has data, the 
applied researcher must be careful to apply a 'little' theory so as to not include 
inappropriate variables along with appropriate variables. Inclusion of inap- 
propriate variables could lead one to believe that economic growth is not relat- 
ed to government size when, in fact, an appropriately specified equation 
would demonstrate the inverse relation. 
Interestingly, Saunders (1985) reports '... Of course, if a larger govern- 
ment sector has crowded-out private investment and thus lowered the invest- 
ment share, the overall negative impact of public expenditure on economic 
growth will be somewhat greater than implied by the coefficient on (G/ Y) it- 
self.' Moreover, Saunders (1985) cites Smith (1975), Cameron (1978), and 
Marsden (1983) as providing some empirical evidence that, given a positive 
relation between investment and economic growth, '... an inverse relation be- 
tween the public expenditure share and economic growth was implied' (p. 11). 
It is a curious matter as to why the specification problem was hinted at in earli- 
er work but not in the recent comment on my paper. 
6. Conclusion 
Further tests and thoughts on the OECD data lead me to conclude that, if any- 
thing, my 1986 paper underestimated the magnitude of the inverse relation be- 
tween economic growth and government size. If one takes the nominal-based 
measure of government scale, as advised by Saunders, the significance levels, 
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 coefficient magnitudes and goodness of fits improve over what I found with 
my initial investigation. I would suggest that Saunders reconsider his reluc- 
tance to believe that the size of the public sector is unrelated to economic 
growth in OECD countries over this time period. 
One additional thought appears relevant to the current policy debate con- 
cerning budget deficits and economic performance within the major industrial- 
ized economies. The empirical work displayed here and in my 1986 paper sug- 
gests serious problems associated with the various proposals urging govern- 
ments to raise taxes and/or 'ease' fiscal policy. Elsewhere, I have suggested 
that available empirical evidence implies that plans to increase taxes as a way 
out of budget deficits are plans that carry the potential for raising government 
spending and possibly future deficits as well.3 Coupled with the evidence 
presented here, we should also recognize the potential of tax increases to raise 
the level of government participation in a country and, accordingly, exert in- 
verse influences on its future economic performance as well. As suggested in 
my 1986 paper, the empirical evidence may suggest the following irony: While 
political participants may crave larger and larger non-market resource alloca- 
tions, their future ability to satisfy that craving may very well be severely con- 
strained by the satisfaction of that same appetite. 
Notes 
1. It is interesting that Saunders (1986: 58) concludes the opposite. 'The potential insights that 
might follow from further study of the Japanese experience within a comparative cross- 
country framework would appear considerable. This is surely a more fruitful way to proceed 
than to discard the informational contents of the Japanese case by treating it as a statistical 
outlier which distorts "more reliable" relationships.' 
2. The interested reader could see Barth, Keleher and Russek (1987) for a useful discussion of the 
available evidence on the government size - economic growth relation. Recent empirical evi- 
dence on the consistency of an inverse relation between government size and economic growth 
within different equation specifications is contained in Barth and Bradley (1987). 
3. Marlow (1987) discusses the available empirical evidence on the tax-spend hypothesis and 
argues that, even if one does not accept the budget constraint type hypothesis, the hypothesis 
that expenditures will also rise along with legislated tax increases can not be reasonably rejected. 
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